Succession to the Throne and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by Cornell, Christopher
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 21 | Number 2 Article 6
2015
Succession to the Throne and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Christopher Cornell
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Update is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Cornell, Succession to the Throne and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 21 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 193 (2015)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol21/iss2/6
SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE AND THE
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS
Christopher Cornell*
HIS article looks at the legal challenge raised in Teskey v. Canada
(Attorney General) (Teskey) against the pending changes to the
legal rules governing succession to the thrones of the sixteen coun-
tries of which Queen Elizabeth II is monarch, at least as far as they apply
to Canada,' as well as the pending changes themselves.** Part I explains
the motivation to change the rules governing succession. Part II discusses
the current rules governing succession to the throne and the background
of those rules. Part III discusses the agreement that led to the pending
changes to the rules of succession. Part IV discusses Teskey's Charter
challenge to the proposed changes to the line of succession and the rele-
vant legal background information. Part V concludes.
I. IMPETUS FOR CHANGE
The rules governing the succession to the thrones of the sixteen king-
doms of which Queen Elizabeth II (the Queen) is monarch have devel-
oped over the centuries in a manner that has left them with certain
aspects that can charitably be described as unnecessarily unfair or dis-
criminatory. 2 Concerns over those discriminatory provisions governing
the succession to their shared monarchy led David Cameron, Prime Min-
ister of The United Kingdom, to convene a meeting of all sixteen of the
* Christopher graduated with a Juris Doctor from the SMU Dedman School of Law
in May 2015 and served as the Canada Reporter for the SMU International Law
Review Association for the 2014-2015 academic year. Prior to beginning law
school he earned a Bachelor of Arts from Trinity University and a Master of Let-
ters from the University of St. Andrews. Christopher would like to thank his fam-
ily, friends, and professors for their continuing support of him in his academic
endeavors.
** Editor's Note: As this issue went to press it was announced that the legal and
legislative process to implement the changes to the line of succession discussed in
this article had been completed and that the changes would go into effect on
March 26, 2015. E.g., Commencement of Succession to the Crown Act 2013: Writ-
ten Statement - HCWS490, 24 Mar. 2015, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2015) 171WS; The
Succession to the Crown Act 2013 (Commencement) Order 2015, SI 2015/894
(U.K.).
1. Teskey v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 6386, paras. 1-4 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.), affd., 2014 ONCA 612 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
2. See HousE- OF COMMONS LIBRARY, SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN BIi t. 2012-2013,
2012-3, H.C. 12/81, at 6 (U.K.).
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Queen's prime ministers during the 2011 Commonwealth Heads of Gov-
ernment Meeting in Perth, Australia.3 This meeting in turn led to the
Perth Agreement-a unique sixteen-party agreement by the governments
of the countries that share the Queen as their Head of State.4 The Perth
Agreement represents a coordinated effort by all sixteen of the Queen's
governments to remove some of the discriminatory provisions governing
the succession to the throne.5
II. LEGAL HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES
OF SUCCESSION AND THE SHARED MONARCHY
A. ORIGINS OF THE CURRENT RULES GOVERNING THE SUCCESSION
The rules of succession to the shared crown are derived primarily from
the common law and three pieces of seventeenth and eighteenth century
English and British legislation: The Bill of Rights, The Act of Settlement,
and The Royal Marriages Act, 1772.6
At the present, common law rules of succession to the throne operate
along the same lines as feudal rules on hereditary land inheritance. 7 To
illustrate, the Crown goes from the reigning monarch to his or her chil-
dren (or those children's descendants) in the following order: oldest son
to youngest son, and then oldest daughter to youngest daughter.8
The Bill of Rights, amongst other things, sets out the rule that the mon-
arch may not be a Roman Catholic or married to a Roman Catholic by
providing for the automatic removal from the line of succession of any
person who was Roman Catholic, became a Roman Catholic, or married
a Roman Catholic, while any non-Roman Catholic children of such mar-
riages remain in the line of succession. 9 As far as it affects succession,
The Act of Settlement reiterates the restrictions on Roman Catholics
from The Bill of Rights, limits succession to the legitimate Protestant de-
scendants of Sophia, Electress of Hanover, and requires that the monarch
become a member of the Church of England if not already a member at




6. See infra notes 7-17.
7. See CABINET OFFICE, SUCCE1SSION TO 'TIlE CROWN BILL EXPLANATORY NoTEs,
2012-3, H.L., at 5 (U.K.).
8. See id.
9. See The Bill of Rights, 1688, t W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.); see also Claim of Right Act
1689, W. & M. c. 28 (Scot.). While certain provisions of The Bill of Rights regulate
succession to the throne in most of the U.K. and all of the other realms, within the
U.K. nation of Scotland The Bill of Rights is not the law and instead those areas of
the succession governed by The Bill of Rights elsewhere are governed in Scotland
by substantially similar language in the pre-union Scottish Parliament's Claim of
Right Act 1689. See Claim of Right Act 1689, supra.
10. The Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2 (Eng.); see also Union with En-
gland Act 1707, Ann. c. 7 (Scot.). Similarly to the situation with The Bill of Rights,
those provisions of The Act of Settlement regulating succession to the throne in
most of the U.K. and all of the other realms are not the law within the U.K. nation
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while the restrictions on the religion of the spouses of persons in the line
of succession only apply to and discriminate against Roman Catholics,"
the restrictions on the religion of persons in the line of succession, while
originally aimed at Roman Catholics, are actually discriminatory against
all non-Protestants because in order to be in the line one must be a Prot-
estant.' 2 Further, the provisions affecting the monarch individually are
even more restrictive as the monarch must belong to the Church of
England.13
The Royal Marriages Act, 1772, applies to all descendants of George II
(which after nearly 250 years for all intents and purposes includes every-
one with any real chance of inheriting the throne) except his female de-
scendants who marry into foreign families and the current monarch.' 4
The act stipulates that there are only two legal ways for affected persons
to marry: (1) they must either receive the monarch's permission for the
marriage to occur, or (2) if they are over the age of twenty-five and have
been refused the monarch's permission, they may still marry if they de-
clare to the Privy Council an intention to go through with their proposed
marriage and twelve months pass without both houses of the U.K. Parlia-
ment passing measures declaring their disapproval.1 5 The legal conse-
quences for marrying against the Act are rather interesting: a marriage
entered into in violation of the act by any descendant of George II to
whom the act applies-including Roman Catholics, who cannot even in-
herit the throne-will legally be considered to have never occurred and
therefore the position of any violator in the line of succession will not be
affected.' 6 Their spouses, on the other hand, will have no legal recogni-
tion, and any children of a violating marriage will be considered illegiti-
mate and, amongst other things, be unable to be in the line of
succession. 17
of Scotland and instead those areas of the succession governed by The Act of Set-
tlement elsewhere are governed in Scotland by substantially similar language in
the pre-union Scottish Parliament's Union with England Act 1707. The one tech-
nical difference between the two is that under The Act of Settlement the monarch
has to join the Church of England, while under the Union With England Act 1707
the monarch must, in Scotland, preserve and maintain the Presbyterian Church of
Scotland. See Union with England Act 1707, supra.
11. See The Bill of Rights, supra note 9.
12. See The Act of Settlement, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. Royal Marriages Act, 1772, 12 Geo. 3 c. 11 (Gr. Brit.).
15. Id.
16. See id.; see also VERNON BOODANOR, Tin MONARCHY AND TII CONS'ITUTION
55 (1995) (discussing the restrictions of the act on Roman Catholic descendants of
George II). One notable example of the restrictions in the act actually protecting
the royal involved occurred in 1785 when the then Prince of Wales was secretly
married, without permission being sought or granted, to Mrs. Fitzherbert who was
Roman Catholic. If not for the Royal Marriages Act 1772 voiding his marriage,
the Prince of Wales would have been barred by The Bill of Rights and The Act of
Settlement from succeeding his father as George IV. See BOGDANOR, supra note
16, at 55.
17. See Royal Marriages Act 1772, supra note 14.
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B. LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SHARED MONARCHY
The historical and legal origin of the shared monarchy can be traced to
the passage of the Statute of Westminster 1931 (the Statute), an act of the
U.K. Parliament that established the legal framework that enabled Brit-
ain's self-governing colonies (then called "dominions") to take complete
control of their domestic and international affairs. 18 The Statute itself
was largely limited to ensuring that the U.K. Parliament could not pass
legislation that was binding on any dominion unless the government of a
dominion asked for such legislation.' 9 But the Statute also effectively es-
tablished that the dominions were from that point largely independent. It
also led to the later passage of domestic and U.K. legislation making the
dominions fully independent, and helped to establish the model for Brit-
ish colonial possessions to transition into fully independent nations (re-
ferred to as realms) with their own separate crowns linked via a shared
monarch. 20 It should also be noted that in discussing the implementation
of the agreement there has also been some mention of the Statute's pre-
amble, which purports to set out a requirement that any changes to the
laws regarding the line of succession or royal titles must be approved by
the parliaments of all of the realms, not just the U.K. Parliament.2' The
U.K. Government has, however, sidestepped this question in its entirety
by pointing out that as the Statute of Westminster is an act of the U.K.
Parliament, the preamble and its text cannot impose any legal require-
ments, though this would not be the case if the requirements in the pre-
amble were part of the body of the statute. 22 The Statute of Westminster
and its related, subsequent developments can thus be seen as leading to
the present shared monarchy where Elizabeth II is the queen of the six-
teen fully sovereign nations commonly known today as the Common-
wealth Realms. 23
From a legal perspective, there is no disagreement that each of the
realms maintains the option to unilaterally break its link with the monar-
chy and adopt another form of government of its choosing. 24 But disa-
18. See Ppr'jiz Boyclu, Ti- QUEEN'S OTHER REALMS 26-27 (2008).
19. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5 c. 4 (U.K.).
20. See Boycl, supra note 18, at 27-29.
21. 13 Mar. 2013, PARL. DIB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2013) 309 (U.K.).
22. See id.
23. The sixteen Commonwealth Realms are the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zea-
land, Canada, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Papua New Guinea, St.
Christopher and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuvalu, Barbados, Gre-
nada, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, and The Bahamas. See, e.g., The Royal House-
hold, What is a Commonwealth Realm?, OFFICIAL WEBSITI BRrT. MONARCHY,
https://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchAndCommonwealth/QueenandCommonwealth/
WhatisaCommonwealthRealm.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2015).
24. An early example of such a break would be India's transition from colony to do-
minion upon independence in 1947 when George VI officially became King of
India until the Indian Constitution had been drafted and entered into force in
1950, at that point India changed overnight from a kingdom to a republic and its
official link with the king and the monarchy was unilaterally severed. See Pamela
White, India, in COLUMBIA CHIRONICLES OI- ASIAN HISIORY AND CUITURE
312-15 (John S. Bowman ed., 2000).
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greement exists as to whether a realm may retain the monarchy while
unilaterally changing some aspect of the institution, for instance, the rules
governing the line of succession, without doing so simultaneously with the
governments of the other realms (though to date, no such change has
been attempted). 25
The one historical example of a fully implemented multilateral change
to the nature of the shared monarchy is the legal process to implement
the abdication of Edward VIII and the subsequent ascension of George
VI to the throne. 26 In that instance Edward VIII signed an instrument of
abdication that was given legal effect when the His Majesty's Declaration
of Abdication Act, 1936 was enacted by the United Kingdom, and with
the consent of their governments, for Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa on December 11, 1936.27 The abdication was given le-
gal effect in The Irish Free State the following day with the enactment by
the Irish Oireachtas (parliament) of the Executive Authority (External
Relations) Act, 1936.28
From the time of the abdication to the present, reform of various as-
pects of the monarchy connected to the succession has been a topic of
intense discussion and even legislative proposals in the United Kingdom,
including a pledge to work for such change by then-Prime Minster
Gordon Brown's Labour Party in its manifesto for the 2010 U.K. General
Election.2 9 But it was not until October 28, 2011 that any concrete pro-
gress was made in the push for reform. David Cameron and his fellow
realm prime ministers held the discussion at the Commonwealth Heads
of Government Meeting in Perth. This ultimately resulted in their agree-
ment to the common program of reforms to the nature of the monarchy
now referred to as the Perth Agreement. 30
III. THE PERTH AGREEMENT, SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS, AND THEIR
LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION
A. CHANGES TO BE BROUGHT ABOUT FOLLOWING THE
PERTH AGREEMENT
At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth the
sixteen realm prime ministers agreed to two concrete proposals to reform
25. See Housie OF COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 2, at 8-9.
26. See id. at 8.
27. His Majesty's Declaration of Abdication Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8. c. 3 (U.K.).
28. Executive Authority (External Relations) Act, 1936, (Act No. 58/1936) (Ir.). Al-
though there was no substantial legal consequence or harm from the Irish delay in
giving legal effect to Edward VIII's abdication and the resulting twenty-four hour
period where the realms did not share a common monarch, it is reasonable to
speculate that this incident may be one factor in the Perth Agreement's require-
ment that the anticipated changes must be legally enacted in all sixteen realms
before going into effect.
29. See Hous, O1 COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 2, at 5-6.
30. See id. at 6-7.
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the line of succession to their shared throne. 31 After the meeting in
Perth, it emerged that there was in fact a third proposal for reform that
had been discussed by Cameron in the invitations he sent to his fellow
realm prime ministers to attend the meeting; and that, though not origi-
nally a part of the earlier Perth Agreement, it had also been agreed to by
all sixteen governments. 32 The agreement to the third proposal effec-
tively made it into a third component of the Perth Agreement. For the
purposes of this article, unless otherwise specified, references to the
agreement should be read as referring to all three proposals.
1. The First Proposal
Under the first proposal, the common law of all sixteen countries is
changed so that the position of an individual in the line of succession
would be based just on when they were born.33 As a result, a daughter
born into the line would no longer be bumped down the line if her par-
ents subsequently have a son in the succession.34 It was also agreed that
the law implementing the change would be written in such a way that this
change would be retroactive to all births in the line of succession after
October 28, 2011, the day of the agreement.35
2. The Second Proposal
The second proposal agreed to at the Perth meeting allows anyone in
the line of succession to marry a Roman Catholic, ending the centuries
old discriminatory ban on persons in the line of succession marrying Ro-
man Catholics while allowing them to marry spouses who are members of
any other (Christian or non-Christian) religion, or who profess no relig-
ious faith at all. 36 This would be accomplished by repealing the provi-
sions of earlier legislation that remove persons who marry Roman
Catholics from the line of succession.37 Notably, persons who had earlier
been removed from the line of succession for marrying Roman Catholics
would be restored to the line, though no person returning to the line via
this change has a realistic chance of becoming monarch. 38 But the ex-
isting requirements that the monarch be a member of the Church of En-
gland and that persons in the line of succession be Protestant will remain
in force. 39
While in Perth, Cameron described the thinking behind and rationale
for these two proposals by stating that, "The idea that a younger son
should become monarch instead of an elder daughter simply because he
31. See infra notes 33-41.
32. See CABINET Oiici, supra note 7, at 2, 5.
33. Housi' OF COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 2, at 6.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 10.
36. See id. at 6.
37. E.g., CA13INET OiFICE, supra note 7, at 5.
38. Id.
39. See id.
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is a man, or that a future monarch can marry someone of any faith except
a Catholic-this way of thinking is at odds with the modern countries that
we have become. ' 40 Cameron also justified continuing the religious re-
strictions that apply to the monarch and persons who are in the line of
succession by saying, "Let me be clear, the monarch must be in commu-
nion with the Church of England because he or she is the head of that
Church. 4 1
3. The Third Proposal
The third proposal agreed to by the sixteen governments would sub-
stantially reform the requirements for persons in the line of succession to
seek approval for their marriages. 42 This reform would be accomplished
by repealing the Royal Marriages Act 1772 and instead only requiring
persons who, at the time they intend to marry, are one of the first six
persons in the line of succession to seek the monarch's consent.43 Nota-
bly though, under the proposal, if the monarch refused to consent and the
person affected went ahead with the proposed marriage anyway, they and
any children they might have would be removed from the line of succes-
sion; though for all other purposes, the marriage itself would be legal and
any children would be legitimate. 44
The third proposal also makes every marriage ever voided under the
Royal Marriages Act 1772 legal. As long as the person involved was not
at the time of the marriage one of the first six persons in the line of suc-
cession, consent to the marriage was not sought, and no notice of intent
to marry was given to the Privy Council, it was reasonable for the person
concerned to not know the act applied to them, and no one involved cited
the act as a basis for voiding the marriage. 45 At the same time, the pro-
posal has one stipulation declaring that the newly validated marriages are
valid for all purposes except for succession to the throne, keeping the
historical line of succession intact.46 Effectively, this part of the proposal
renders most of the marriages ever voided by the Royal Marriages Act
1772 valid, but with the caveat that, even though a marriage has been
validated, the removal from the line of succession of the person involved
and their descendants remains in effect.
40. Nicholas Watt, Royal Succession Gender Equality Approved by Commonwealth,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2011, 7:29 AM), http:/Ywww.theguardian.com/uk/2011/oct/28/
royal-succession-gender-equality-approved.
41. Girls Equal in British Throne Succession, BBC Nr~ws (Oct. 28, 2011, 1:43 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15492607.
42. See CAB1NI T OFFICE, supra note 7, at 5.
43. See, e.g., id. at 5-6.
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B. THE LEGAL PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PERTH AGREEMENT
At Perth, after coming to the agreement to change the rules of the
succession, the sixteen prime ministers also agreed on a basic plan of ac-
tion to implement the changes. 47 This plan called for the Government of
New Zealand to coordinate the multilateral sixteen-party discussion as to
how the language implementing the agreement should be drafted and
then, once agreement on the language was reached, the U.K. Govern-
ment would draft its own piece of legislation to implement it.48 That
piece of legislation would then be presented to the U.K. Parliament only
once the member of the U.K. Government responsible for coordinating
with the other realms, Cameron's then Deputy Prime Minister, Nick
Clegg, had received written letters of consent from each of the realms
indicating they were ready to begin taking the necessary steps to imple-
ment the changes. 49 Clegg's office confirmed on December 4, 2012, that
it had received all of those letters, and on December 13, 2012, the bill was
introduced and given its first reading. 50 For purposes of this article, dis-
cussion will be limited to the passage of the relevant U.K. and Canadian
legislation.
1. Implementation of the United Kingdom Legislation
The U.K. legislation, the Succession to the Crown Act 2013 (Succession
Act), is itself a rather short piece of legislation, consisting of less than
three pages, one of which consists of just a schedule of items in previous
legislation that need to be changed in light of the agreement. 51 The Suc-
cession Act consists of five sections in addition to the above-mentioned
schedule.5 2 The first of these sections implements the changes in regard
to gender. The second addresses the changes in regard to the religious
requirements of royal spouses. And the third-which is larger than the
first two combined-contains all of the technical minutiae required to ef-
fect the changes on consent to royal marriages.5 3 The fourth section of
the Succession Act contains the technical details required to alter earlier
legislation to make it compatible with the new changes. The final section
contains the short name for the Succession Act and stipulates that it will
go into effect immediately, but that the other sections will only go into
effect once the government so stipulates. 54 This delay was deliberately
built into the Succession Act so the U.K. Government would be able to
make sure that it implements the changes in unison with the other
realms.55 The Succession Act was passed by the House of Commons on
47. See id. at 3.
48. See id.
49. See Housi 017 COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 2, at 9.
50. Id. at 13.
51. See Succession to the Crown Act 2013, c. 20 (U.K.).
52. See id.
53. See id. §§1 - 3.
54. See id. §§4 - 5.
55. See CABINET OTICE, supra note 7, at 7.
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January 28, 2013, and was then introduced in the House of Lords on Janu-
ary 29, 2013, where it passed on April 22, 2013, before being sent to the
Queen, who signed it into law on April 25, 2013.56
2. Implementation in Canada
On March 27, 2013, the Canadian Parliament's Succession to the
Throne Act, 2013 was signed into law.57 Through this Act the Canadian
Parliament assented to "[t]he alteration in the law touching the Succes-
sion to the Throne" set out in the U.K. Succession to the Crown Act
2013.58 This choice of language is interesting in that it reflects that the
Canadian Government believes that any change to the law of succession
in the United Kingdom automatically applies to Canada as soon as it is
assented to by the Canadian Parliament. 59 The legal basis for this argu-
ment rests first on an inferential principle of symmetry in the Canadian
Constitution, which provides that the person occupying the throne of the
United Kingdom is automatically the monarch of Canada.60 Under that
legal logic, Canada should not have had to even pass its own legislation
on the issue. However, it would appear that under Canadian law (unlike
U.K. law6 1) the preamble to the Statute of Westminster is a substantive
provision of that act itself. Thus, for the change to the line of succession
to apply in Canada, it must first be assented to by the Canadian Parlia-
ment, as was done through the enactment of the Succession to the Throne
Act, 2013.62
Despite the Canadian Parliament having passed legislation that it as-
serts implemented the Perth Agreement under Canadian law, that legisla-
tion has, to date, been attacked on two grounds. The first of these is the
continuing bar on a Catholic monarch dealt with in Teskey and discussed
in the next section.6 3 The second attack stems from what would appear
to be a legitimate difference of legal opinion between the Government's
claim that no constitutional amendment was necessary to incorporate the
changes to the line of succession into Canadian law64 and an alternate
legal argument that such a constitutional amendment was necessary65
that will ultimately probably have to be settled by the Supreme Court of
Canada.
56. Parliament of the U.K., Bill Stages-Succession to the Crown Act 2013, U.K. PAR-
LIAMENTr, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-1 3/successiontothecrown/stages.
html (last visited Apr. 24, 2015).
57. See Succession to the Throne Act, 2013, S.C. 2013, c. 6 (Can.).
58. Id.
59. See Peter W. Hogg, Succession to the Throne, 33 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 83, 89-90
(2014).
60. See id. at 92 - 93.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 21 - 22.
62. See Hogg, supra note 59 at 92.
63. See infra Part IV.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 57 - 60, 62.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 66 - 71.
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In a legal complaint filed with the Superior Court of Quebec on June 6,
2013, by two legal scholars from Laval University, Genevieve Motard and
Patrick Taillon, it is asserted that under Canadian law the Succession to
the Throne Act, 2013, is unconstitutional. 66 The primary argument ad-
vanced by Motard and Taillon is that changes to the line of succession
fundamentally alter the "office of the Queen" and therefore to be consti-
tutional, any changes to the line of succession must be approved by both
houses of parliament and the legislatures of all the provinces under sec-
tion 41(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982.67 The complainants also make
two secondary arguments. First they argue that the Succession to the
Throne Act, 2013, is additionally unconstitutional under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is part of the Canadian Constitu-
tion, because the Act fails to remove the discriminatory requirement that
the monarch must be a member of the Church of England (a legal claim
that will be discussed below in relation to Teskey.) 68 Their other secon-
dary argument asserts that the Succession to the Throne Act, 2013, is un-
constitutional because the United Kingdom's Succession Act, which
contains the changes that the Canadian act was passed to implement, was
written in English, not in French.69 Interestingly, the challengers them-
selves did not file their complaint out of opposition to the changes made
by the Succession to the Throne Act, 2013.70 Rather, they think that
under the Canadian Constitution, the changes should have been ap-
proved by the provincial legislatures and Parliament and that before the
Perth Agreement can be operative in Canada that the legislation imple-
menting it must be consented to by the provinces. 71
It bears pointing out that the Canadian Government has noted that
when the Succession to the Throne Act, 2013 was being adopted, none of
the provinces objected to not being consulted, with the obvious implica-
66. See, e.g., Janyce McGregor, Royal Baby Law Challenge Could End Up at Supreme
Court, CBC NEWS (June 12, 2013, 8:48 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/royal-
baby-law-challenge-could-end-up-at-supreme-court-l. 1415337.
67. See Motion to Institute Proceedings for Declaratory Judgment at 2, Motard v. At-
torney General of Canada (2013) (Can. Que. Super. Ct.) (initiating motion for the
current court proceedings filed before the Superior Court of Quebec by Motard
and Taillon on 6 June 2013, please note that the court has yet to assign the case a
public docket number) available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/712552/
motard-taillon-requete-jugement-declaratoire.pdf; see also Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
app. II, no. 44 (Can.) (contains the constitutional provision Motard and Taillon
claim requires the federal parliament and the provincial legislatures to consent to
the changes to the line of succession for them to be constitutional).
68. See Motion to Institute Proceedings for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 67 at 3;
see also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, app. II, no. 44 (Can.) (contains the constitutional provisions that Motard and
Taillon claim render the Succession to the Throne Act, 2013 unconstitutional for
failing to remove the requirement that the monarch be a member of the Church of
England).
69. See Motion to Institute Proceedings for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 67, at 3.
70. See McGregor, supra note 66.
71. See, e.g., id.
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tion being the provinces did not object because none of them thought
that they were constitutionally required to give their consent.72 Further,
it can easily be argued that the Canadian Government's approach is the
correct one when implementing changes to ensure that the United King-
dom and Canada have the same monarch, but if Canada were to alter its
law so that it had a monarch other than the monarch of the United King-
dom, then it would be necessary for both Parliament and the provinces to
consent to the changes in the form of a constitutional amendment.73
Both the challengers and the Canadian Government believe strongly in
the merits of their legal arguments, and as a result, this case will likely be
litigated until the Canadian Supreme Court issues a definitive ruling.74
Such a ruling however might be some time coming, as the Superior Court
of Quebec will not hear Motard and Taillon's case until June 2015.7 5
IV. TESKEY V. CANADA (ATIORNEY GENERAL) AND THE
BAR ON A CATHOLIC MONARCH
A. TESKEY V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) OR O'DONOHUE
REVISITED
Following the enactment of the Succession to the Throne Act, 2013,
Bryan Teskey, a Canadian Roman Catholic who had recently completed
legal studies at the University of Ottawa, challenged the law in the Onta-
rio Superior Court of Justice. 76 Teskey argued that the Succession to the
Throne Act, 2013 and the Perth Agreement it meant to implement vio-
lated the Canadian Constitution, specifically its Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, by not removing the legal ban on a Roman Catho-
lic becoming monarch of Canada. 77
The same issue of the discriminatory ban on Roman Catholics becom-
ing monarch of Canada had been dealt with by the Ontario courts a dec-
ade earlier in O'Donohue v. Canada.78 In that case, Tony O'Donohue
unsuccessfully argued that that the legislation setting out the ban on Ro-
man Catholics becoming monarch, the Act of Settlement, was unconstitu-
tional and should be struck down for violating the Charter. 79 In
addressing O'Donohue's claim, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
ruled that the rules excluding Roman Catholics from the line of succes-
72. See id.
73. See Hogg, supra note 59, at 93.
74. See McGregor, supra note 66.
75. Allison Jones, Royal Baby Law Stands as Court Dismisses Catholic Challenge,
CBC Niws (Aug 27, 2014, 7:32 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/m/news/politics/royal-
baby-law-stands-as-court-dismisses-catholic-challenge-.2748020.
76. Yamri Taddese, Law Grad Plans Appeal After Royal Succession Challenge Dis-




78. O'Donohue v. Canada, 2003 CarswellOnt 2573 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL), af'd,
2005 CarswellOnt 951 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (WL).
79. Id. para. 1.
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sion were part of the Canadian Constitution and thus were not subject to
a challenge via the Charter because it does not apply to other parts of the
Constitution.80 The court further ruled that because there was no valid
constitutional challenge to be raised, O'Donohue did not have standing
to bring a case. 81 The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the lower
court ruling in a one-paragraph opinion stating that it agreed with the
ruling of the lower court.82
In its ruling in Teskey, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice made it
clear that this case was similar to O'Donohue and that its ruling was
bound by earlier precedent. 83 With that in mind, the court dismissed the
case for the similar reasons of there being no issue for the court to con-
sider and Teskey's lack of standing to bring a claim.84
In setting out its analysis for why the case should be dismissed, the
court liberally quoted from and cited to O'Donohue.85 In this case, Tes-
key objected to the implementation of the Perth Agreement in Canada
because the discriminatory provision barring a Catholic from becoming
Canada's monarch was to remain in place. 86 This might have very likely
been an attempt to get around O'Donohue by arguing that the new legis-
lation opened the rules of succession to Charter review and presumably
invalidation. In any case, with respect to the rules of succession, the
court, while citing to O'Donohue, held that the rules were a part of the
Constitution, and thus not subject to Charter review. 87 Teskey, like
O'Donohue, argued that Canada could and should adopt a different (and
non-Catholic excluding) set of rules-and possibly a different monarch
from the United Kingdom-but the court rejected that outright by stating
that such a change would fundamentally alter the Canadian Constitution
and "would involve the court changing, rather than protecting, our funda-
mental constitutional structure. ' 88 The court further opined that the
changes envisioned by the Perth Agreement and assented to by the Suc-
cession to the Throne Act, 2013 were properly implemented with respect
to Canada as the United Kingdom had expressed a desire to modify some
of the rules of succession and the Canadian Parliament had consented to
those changes in accordance with the process established by the Statute
of Westminster. 89 In regard to Teskey's standing, the court held the
following:
[A] member of the Catholic faith but that appears to be his only
interest in the issues raised in this application. He has no connection
80. Id. paras. 36-37.
81. Id. para. 39.
82. O'Donohue v. Canada, 2005 CarswellOnt 951, para. 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (WL).
83. Teskey v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 6386, para. 7 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.), afpfd, 2014 ONCA 612 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., id. paras. 8 - 15.
86. Id. para. 8.
87. Id. paras. 12, 15.
88. Id. para. 13.
89. Id. para. 14.
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to the Royal Family. He raises a purely hypothetical issue that may
never occur, namely a Roman Catholic Canadian in line for succes-
sion to the throne being passed over because of his or her religion.
Should this ever occur a proper factual matrix would be available to
the court to deal with a matter of this importance. 90
Effectively, setting aside the fact that the issue was already non-judicia-
ble because of the rules of succession not being subject to the Charter,
Teskey did not have standing to bring his case because although he was
Roman Catholic, he was not a member of the Royal Family, and there
was no overriding public interest to protect because there may very well
never end up being a Roman Catholic Canadian excluded from the
throne because of their religion. 91 On appeal, in August 2014 the Court
of Appeal for Ontario agreed with the lower court and dismissed Teskey's
appeal due to a lack of both standing and any issue for the court to de-
cide.92 It would thus appear (pending any further judicial action to the
contrary) that the prohibition on the Canadian Monarch being Catholic,
while discriminatory, is perfectly-if not fundamentally-constitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
Elizabeth II's prime ministers set out to alter the rules governing the
line of succession to make them fairer to those individuals to whom they
applied. Teskey argued that because members of the Roman Catholic
faith were still excluded from the throne, the changes to the rules of suc-
cession and the rules themselves were, in terms of Canadian law, uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The Ontario courts disagree, holding that as long as they were properly
implemented, the changes to the rules of succession were themselves a
part of the Canadian Constitution and thus protected from Charter re-
view. Therefore, it would seem that if those provisions of the rules of
succession that Teskey and O'Donohue deplore are to be changed or re-
moved it will have to be accomplished politically and legislatively through
another multilateral agreement similar to the Perth Agreement rather
than judicially through the courts.
90. Id. para. 16.
91. See id. paras. 15-16, 19.
92. Teskey v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 612, paras. 5 - 6 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
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